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Adds the native SwiftUI Saved Devices experience on top of the production saved-device core, as a top-level destination in the iOS tab bar and the macOS sidebar. Core seam: - App-facing saved-device domain models mirroring core/SavedDeviceModels.kt, with lifecycle helpers (canReceive/canResume/canCancel/canDelete) so views never hand-roll state checks. - 21 gateway methods through CoreGateway/CoreRepository with UniFFI mapping. cancelTargetedTransfer, forgetSavedDevice and blockDevice run off the serial lane: each must reach the core while a targeted receive is blocking it. - Payload-free pairingChanged/targetedTransferChanged signals, dispatched before the numeric-transferId guard since saved-device events identify their subject by peer endpoint or a string transfer id. Experience: - Screen lists saved devices and outstanding consent requests only; the global targeted-transfer history stays out, reachable per device. - Details as a sheet with detents on compact layouts and a native inspector on macOS, owning Send, label, forget/block and that device's transfers. - Label editing is transactional: the draft and editor survive a failed write, conflicting actions are refused while saving, and the editor closes only after the core confirms. - Pairing and targeted-offer consent hosted at the app root, answerable from any tab and suppressed while a transfer approval is up. Dismissing a pairing prompt suppresses locally without consuming the single-use eligibility; dismissing an offer declines it, since an unanswered offer holds a slot in the core's bounded per-sender queue. - Targeted send reuses the invitation composer's affordances with file, folder, rename, replace and cleanup parity. Picker copies are released on replace/remove/clear/cancel and after a successful create, but kept after a failure so retry does not require re-picking. - Notifications for pairing requests and offers (withdrawn once answered) and for terminal targeted transfers. Wording follows direction: on the sending device the peer finished receiving, not us. Localization: - Widens 52 saved-device keys from kmp-only to both platforms. - Five keys carried a literal %1$s with no declared args, which Compose renders positionally but the Apple generator emits as a plain constant, leaking the placeholder into the UI. They now use named args; Compose output is byte-identical. - Adds targeted_offer_title/body. Reusing the invitation approval copy stated the roles backwards, announcing the sender as the receiver. Also surfaces core startup failures: the startup overlay is drawn above the snackbar host, so a failed initialize() was indistinguishable from an app that never finished loading. AppModel now keeps the reason, logs it, and the overlay shows it with a retry, plus the technical detail in DEBUG builds. Send and receive between two devices is verified only partially; a missing endpoint-identity credential currently blocks startup on the test device.
102 lines
3.5 KiB
Swift
102 lines
3.5 KiB
Swift
#if os(macOS)
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import Foundation
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import AppKit
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import VnidropCore
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/// macOS file system service. Mirrors the desktop JVM behavior: default Downloads
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/// receive folder, custom folders enabled via security-scoped bookmarks, reveal in
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/// Finder. The Rust core streams bytes; Swift passes filesystem paths.
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struct MacFileSystemService: FileSystemService {
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var supportsCustomReceiveFolders: Bool { true }
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func defaultReceiveFolder() -> ReceiveFolder {
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let url = FileManager.default.urls(for: .downloadsDirectory, in: .userDomainMask).first
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?? FileManager.default.homeDirectoryForCurrentUser.appendingPathComponent("Downloads")
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return ReceiveFolder(kind: .fileSystemPath, value: url.path, displayName: url.lastPathComponent)
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}
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func validateReceiveFolder(_ folder: ReceiveFolder) async -> FolderAccessStatus {
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FileManager.default.isWritableFile(atPath: folder.value) ? .writable : .unavailable
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}
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func canRevealReceiveFolder(_ folder: ReceiveFolder) -> Bool { true }
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func revealReceiveFolder(_ folder: ReceiveFolder) async -> Result<Void, Error> {
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let url = URL(fileURLWithPath: folder.value, isDirectory: true)
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NSWorkspace.shared.activateFileViewerSelecting([url])
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return .success(())
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}
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func discardPickedFiles(_ files: [PickedShareFile]) async {
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let paths = Set(files.filter { $0.isTemporaryCopy }.map { $0.value })
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for path in paths {
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try? FileManager.default.removeItem(atPath: path)
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}
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}
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func sharePickedFiles(
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repository: CoreGateway,
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files: [PickedShareFile],
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transferName: String,
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senderName: String,
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destination: ShareDestination
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) async -> Result<Share, Error> {
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guard !files.isEmpty else {
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return .failure(InvitationError.shareEmpty)
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}
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guard case .invitation(let accessPolicy) = destination else {
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return .failure(InvitationError.unsupportedOperation)
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}
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return await withScopedSources(files) { sources in
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await repository.shareSources(
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sources, transferName: transferName, senderName: senderName, accessPolicy: accessPolicy
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)
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}
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}
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func sendPickedFilesToSavedDevice(
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repository: CoreGateway,
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files: [PickedShareFile],
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transferName: String,
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receiverEndpointId: String
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) async -> Result<TargetedTransferModel, Error> {
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guard !files.isEmpty else {
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return .failure(InvitationError.shareEmpty)
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}
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return await withScopedSources(files) { sources in
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await repository.createTargetedTransfer(
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receiverEndpointId: receiverEndpointId,
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sources: sources,
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transferName: transferName.isEmpty ? nil : transferName
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)
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}
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}
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/// Re-acquires security-scoped access to every picked source (from the bookmark
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/// captured at pick time) and holds it across `body`. The core imports the bytes
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/// during that call, so access only needs to survive it; without this the import
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/// fails with EPERM under the App Store sandbox.
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private func withScopedSources<T>(
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_ files: [PickedShareFile],
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_ body: ([ShareSource]) async -> Result<T, Error>
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) async -> Result<T, Error> {
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var scopedURLs: [URL] = []
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for file in files {
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guard let bookmark = file.securityScopeBookmark else { continue }
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var stale = false
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guard let url = try? URL(
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resolvingBookmarkData: bookmark, options: .withSecurityScope,
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relativeTo: nil, bookmarkDataIsStale: &stale
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), url.startAccessingSecurityScopedResource() else { continue }
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scopedURLs.append(url)
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}
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defer { scopedURLs.forEach { $0.stopAccessingSecurityScopedResource() } }
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let sources = files.map {
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ShareSource(kind: .path, value: $0.value, displayName: $0.displayName, isDirectory: $0.isDirectory)
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}
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return await body(sources)
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}
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}
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#endif
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