Files
vnidrop/apple/VniDrop/Core/CoreGateway.swift
cdricms 8bb1442338 feat(apple): saved devices and targeted transfers UI
Adds the native SwiftUI Saved Devices experience on top of the production
saved-device core, as a top-level destination in the iOS tab bar and the
macOS sidebar.

Core seam:
- App-facing saved-device domain models mirroring core/SavedDeviceModels.kt,
  with lifecycle helpers (canReceive/canResume/canCancel/canDelete) so views
  never hand-roll state checks.
- 21 gateway methods through CoreGateway/CoreRepository with UniFFI mapping.
  cancelTargetedTransfer, forgetSavedDevice and blockDevice run off the serial
  lane: each must reach the core while a targeted receive is blocking it.
- Payload-free pairingChanged/targetedTransferChanged signals, dispatched
  before the numeric-transferId guard since saved-device events identify
  their subject by peer endpoint or a string transfer id.

Experience:
- Screen lists saved devices and outstanding consent requests only; the
  global targeted-transfer history stays out, reachable per device.
- Details as a sheet with detents on compact layouts and a native inspector
  on macOS, owning Send, label, forget/block and that device's transfers.
- Label editing is transactional: the draft and editor survive a failed
  write, conflicting actions are refused while saving, and the editor closes
  only after the core confirms.
- Pairing and targeted-offer consent hosted at the app root, answerable from
  any tab and suppressed while a transfer approval is up. Dismissing a
  pairing prompt suppresses locally without consuming the single-use
  eligibility; dismissing an offer declines it, since an unanswered offer
  holds a slot in the core's bounded per-sender queue.
- Targeted send reuses the invitation composer's affordances with file,
  folder, rename, replace and cleanup parity. Picker copies are released on
  replace/remove/clear/cancel and after a successful create, but kept after a
  failure so retry does not require re-picking.
- Notifications for pairing requests and offers (withdrawn once answered) and
  for terminal targeted transfers. Wording follows direction: on the sending
  device the peer finished receiving, not us.

Localization:
- Widens 52 saved-device keys from kmp-only to both platforms.
- Five keys carried a literal %1$s with no declared args, which Compose
  renders positionally but the Apple generator emits as a plain constant,
  leaking the placeholder into the UI. They now use named args; Compose
  output is byte-identical.
- Adds targeted_offer_title/body. Reusing the invitation approval copy stated
  the roles backwards, announcing the sender as the receiver.

Also surfaces core startup failures: the startup overlay is drawn above the
snackbar host, so a failed initialize() was indistinguishable from an app
that never finished loading. AppModel now keeps the reason, logs it, and the
overlay shows it with a retry, plus the technical detail in DEBUG builds.

Send and receive between two devices is verified only partially; a missing
endpoint-identity credential currently blocks startup on the test device.
2026-08-13 19:42:37 +02:00

98 lines
4.3 KiB
Swift

import Foundation
import Combine
import VnidropCore
struct CoreStorageUsageModel: Sendable {
let blobStoreBytes: UInt64
let appDataBytes: UInt64
}
struct ReceivedArtifactModel: Sendable {
let locator: String
let logicalSize: UInt64
}
/// Seam between the feature models and the Rust core, mirroring `CoreGateway`
/// in the KMP `shared` module. `CoreRepository` is the production implementation;
/// tests substitute a fake so the models can be exercised without the FFI.
@MainActor
protocol CoreGateway: AnyObject {
/// Latest published core state.
var state: CoreState { get }
/// Publisher of core-state changes (the models subscribe to this).
var statePublisher: AnyPublisher<CoreState, Never> { get }
/// Coalesced change hints emitted by the event sink.
var signals: AnyPublisher<CoreSignal, Never> { get }
func initialize(appDataDir: String, networkConfiguration: RelayConfiguration) async -> Result<Void, Error>
func shutdown()
func shareSources(
_ sources: [ShareSource],
transferName: String,
senderName: String,
accessPolicy: ShareAccessPolicy
) async -> Result<Share, Error>
func inspectTicket(_ ticket: String) async -> Result<TicketInspectionModel, Error>
func receive(ticket: String, outputDir: String, receiverName: String) async -> Result<Void, Error>
func receiveIntoSecurityScopedDirectory(
ticket: String,
outputDirectoryUrl: String,
receiverName: String
) async -> Result<Void, Error>
func cancel(transferId: UInt64) async -> Result<Void, Error>
func delete(transferId: UInt64) async -> Result<Void, Error>
func clearReceiveHistory() async -> Result<UInt64, Error>
func storageUsage() async -> Result<CoreStorageUsageModel, Error>
func receivedArtifacts() async -> Result<[ReceivedArtifactModel], Error>
func receiverRequests(transferId: UInt64) async -> Result<[ReceiverRequestModel], Error>
func respondReceiverRequest(requestId: String, accepted: Bool, reason: String?) async -> Result<Void, Error>
func refresh() async -> Result<Void, Error>
// MARK: - Saved devices
func listPairingEligibilities() async -> Result<[PairingEligibilityModel], Error>
func declinePairingEligibility(peerEndpointId: String) async -> Result<Void, Error>
/// Asks a peer to pair. Returns false when no valid eligibility exists, which
/// the core rejects silently so a stranger cannot provoke a prompt.
func requestSavedDevicePairing(peerEndpointId: String) async -> Result<Bool, Error>
func respondToDevicePairing(peerEndpointId: String, accepted: Bool) async -> Result<Bool, Error>
func listDeviceRelationships() async -> Result<[DeviceRelationshipModel], Error>
func listSavedDevices() async -> Result<[SavedDeviceModel], Error>
/// Sets or clears (`nil`) the user-owned local label.
func setSavedDeviceLabel(peerEndpointId: String, label: String?) async -> Result<Void, Error>
func forgetSavedDevice(peerEndpointId: String) async -> Result<Void, Error>
func blockDevice(peerEndpointId: String) async -> Result<Void, Error>
/// Removes only the deny rule. Grants, relationships, and cancelled transfers
/// are not restored re-saving needs another qualifying transfer and consent.
func unblockDevice(peerEndpointId: String) async -> Result<Void, Error>
func listBlockedDevices() async -> Result<[String], Error>
// MARK: - Targeted transfers
func listPendingTargetedOffers() async -> Result<[PendingTargetedOfferModel], Error>
func respondToTargetedOffer(
transferId: String,
accepted: Bool
) async -> Result<TargetedOfferResponseModel, Error>
func createTargetedTransfer(
receiverEndpointId: String,
sources: [ShareSource],
transferName: String?
) async -> Result<TargetedTransferModel, Error>
func listTargetedTransfers() async -> Result<[TargetedTransferModel], Error>
/// Pulls an approved transfer into a security-scoped destination, holding
/// access for the duration of the stream (mirrors the invitation receive path).
func receiveTargetedTransfer(
transferId: String,
outputDirectoryUrl: String
) async -> Result<Void, Error>
/// Resumes an interrupted transfer. The same immutable transfer continues from
/// its verified progress and is not re-approved.
func resumeTargetedTransfer(
id: String,
outputDirectoryUrl: String
) async -> Result<Void, Error>
func cancelTargetedTransfer(id: String) async -> Result<Void, Error>
func deleteTargetedTransfer(id: String) async -> Result<Void, Error>
}